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Bloom's synthesis of the materialist and nationalist accounts of 
the civil rights movement is more credible than either taken sepa-
rately, an4, though it may not completely rout the competing elitist-
ideological account, to which Bloom devotes little attention, it does 
show the persuasive power of a coherent alternative account. It de-
serves consideration by a wide audience. 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN AMERICA: ESSAYS 
ON THE SEPARATION OF POWERS. By Charles Har-
din.I Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press. 1989. Pp. 
236. $27.95. 
Robert G. Kaufman 2 
Is there something seriously wrong with the American political 
system? Many observers think so. Most can agree on some or all of 
the symptoms of the problem: the weakening of political parties, 
the diffusion of power within Congress, the erosion of presidential 
authority, the growing influence of special interests, money, and 
lobbyists, a burgeoning bureaucracy largely beyond executive or 
congressional control, political gridlock between a predominantly 
Republican presidency and a Democratic congress. Yet no consen-
sus exists about the solution.J 
Reformers fall into two distinct groups, which sharply disagree 
about the requisite reforms. Moderate critics defend the principle 
of separation of powers, the existence of three independent political 
institutions with separate constitutional standing. They argue 
against constitutional change, and wish instead to revise the "Un-
written Constitution," those customs and arrangements that enable 
a government of separate institutions to function, such as the inter-
nal arrangements of the Congress. 4 
Others argue, however, that the separation of powers is the 
root cause of America's constitutional problems. Charles Hardin is 
a longtime advocate of this more radical challenge to the existing 
system. Drawing on the analysis of constitutional scholar Charles 
Mcilwain, Hardin argues, in this compilation of essays which sum-
marizes his extensive work on the subject, that the separation of 
I. Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University of California, Davis. 
2. Assistant Professor of Political Science, Colgate University. 
3. For a sound journalistic assessment of these problems, see H. SMITH, THE POWER 
GAME: How WASHINGTON WORKS (1987). 
4. D. PRICE, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION (1983). 
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powers is a threat to constitutionalism itself: it prevents us from 
finding an effective way of replacing an incapacitated president who 
has failed politically; it fosters deadlock and lack of accountability 
by hopelessly dividing authority between legislative and executive 
branches; it promotes the interests of "iron triangles" and special 
interests over the national interest; it precludes the formulation and 
implementation of an effective foreign policy. He suggests that we 
adopt some variant of the parliamentary system, which unifies exec-
utive and legislative authority, eliminates fixed-calendar elections, 
allows for elections at the discretion of the government-of-the-day, 
and establishes the procedure of removing failed executives by votes 
of no confidence. 
Although Hardin offers some compelling criticisms of the sepa-
ration of powers, his argument for abolishing the principle ulti-
mately fails. Separation of powers has not worked perfectly, but it 
has given us two hundred years of stable and effective government. 
Hardin's "cure" would impose costs which we should not and 
would not accept. He rests his case for parliamentary democracy 
on an excessively restrictive view of the purposes of constitutional 
government. His case also rests on the dubious premise that parlia-
mentary systems have performed better than our system. The evi-
dence he marshals in support of this premise, particularly in the 
realm of foreign affairs, is unpersuasive, because Hardin's policy 
preferences overwhelm his objectivity. 
Like many who make the case against separation of powers, 
Hardin combines two distinct, though interrelated, lines of argu-
ment. One is rationalist: separation of powers is inconsistent with 
the imperative of making policy rationally, decisively, and effi-
ciently; whatever rationality separation of powers may have had in 
the relatively simple world of the framers, it is outmoded in today's 
dangerous and interdependent world. 
The other line of argument is liberal. Before Watergate and 
the paralyzing debate over the Vietnam War, many argued that the 
separation of powers thwarted the large and active role that the fed-
eral government should play in expanding the welfare state. This 
led some to advocate a stronger (presumably liberal) presidency and 
a weaker (presumably obstructionist) congress.s Thereafter, how-
ever, the rationale shifted as reformers sought to restrict an Impe-
rial Presidency which supposedly had brought about the Watergate 
crisis and the Vietnam debacle. 
S. For this classification of the rationalist and liberal arguments against separation of 
powers, I owe James Q. Wilson. See, e.g., Wilson, Does the Separation of Powers Still Work?, 
PUB. INTEREST, Winter, 1987, at 36, 37-39. 
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Hardin argues, on the one hand, that the separation of powers 
has allowed "iron triangles" of congressmen, special interests, and 
bureaucrats to deadlock arms control negotiations and other critical 
foreign policy initiatives. From this perspective, it makes sense to 
strengthen the power of the president. Yet he also argues that the 
separation has "deified" the presidency, led to government by 
"presidential whim," and institutionalized "a constitutional flaw of 
first importance" because it precludes the replacement of a presi-
dent who has become politically disabled. Such arguments are con-
sistent with the rationalist case against the separation. 
In discussing the foreign policy implications of separation of 
powers, however, Hardin's arguments are also consistent with the 
post-Watergate liberal critique of the Imperial Presidency. Thus, 
he blames Ronald Reagan and the military-industrial complex for 
the breakdown of arms control negotiations during the early 1980s, 
negotiations whose virtues he considers self-evident. Similarly, he 
blames hawks in Congress and iron triangles for blocking the SALT 
II Treaty of 1979, another arms control endeavor which, according 
to Hardin, was obviously in the national interest. His treatment of 
the CIA and the Vietnam War also reflects the post-Vietnam liberal 
agenda. 
There are ample grounds to dispute Hardin's rationalist case. 
The framers did not consider efficiency an absolute value; hence, 
they established a system based on the separation of powers, or 
what Richard Neustadt more accurately describes as separate insti-
tutions sharing powers, which protected against the tyranny of the 
majority, or of a faction, or of the national government. Nor have 
conditions changed so dramatically as to render the framers' con-
cerns and solutions frivolous. George Washington and Abraham 
Lincoln faced problems no less daunting than today's budgetary 
and security issues. The separation of powers is still the main bul-
wark protecting individual and community rights from abuse by a 
powerful federal government. Hardin devotes too little attention to 
these competing concerns. 
There are even more substantial grounds for rejecting Hardin's 
liberal interpretation of current events. Because much of his cri-
tique focuses on foreign affairs, his tendentiousness on the subject 
deserves special mention. Consider his discussion of arms control. 
It is not self-evident, to this writer among many others, that the 
SALT II Treaty whose failure Hardin laments did not deserve to 
fail. If the treaty was a bad one, then perhaps its defeat vindicated 
our traditional system. 
Similarly, events have demolished the premises and arguments 
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of Hardin's essay on the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) 
between 1981 and 1985. Both Hardin and Strobe Talbott, on whose 
questionable journalistic account of the negotiations Hardin relies, 
regard the breakdown of arms control negotiations between 1981 
and 1985 as a disaster attributable to the American stance on such 
negotiations.6 Why? Reagan's success in achieving the Intermedi-
ate Ranged Ballistic Missile (INF) Treaty of 1987 on terms Talbott 
and others thought impossible seems to vindicate the very negotiat-
ing stance that Hardin condemns. Furthermore, Hardin and Tal-
bott misread the motives of those who persuaded President Reagan 
to take his hard and successful line. It was the policy attitudes of 
men like Richard Pedes and Casper Weinberger, not the "iron tri-
angle," that were the main reason for the Reagan Administration's 
successful arms control strategy.' Thus, the outcome of the Reagan 
Administration's phase of nuclear arms talks may stand as another 
example of how separation of powers works. Our system imple-
ments only those goals that can survive a process of protracted bar-
gaining and consultation, and this apparent weakness spared the 
United States a hasty and ill-advised arms treaty on less favorable 
terms. 
Hardin fails to demonstrate that a parliamentary system would 
perform better. He concedes that Britain's experience is "critical to 
the evaluation of parliamentarianism," which by his own admission 
raises some difficulties for his argument. Samuel Beer, S.E. Finer 
and others have argued that the parliamentary system was one of 
the causes of the rise of Great Britain's socialist welfare state, the 
convergence on collectivism of the political parties, and concomi-
tant social and economic problems. Hardin offers a plausible rebut-
tal of this indictment. 
Hardin, however, does not stop there: "even if Great Britain 
were to go broke tomorrow, its record ... might still make it an 
exemplary one, superior to the American system." Have parlia-
mentary democracy in general and Great Britain's variant in partic-
ular more effectively addressed major problems, such as deficits, 
economic policy, and foreign policy? The evidence does not sup-
port this assertion. Neither Great Britain nor most parliamentary 
democracies have deficits smaller than ours, measured as a percent-
age of GNP.s Similarly, our aggregate economic performance com-
6. S. TALBOTI, DEADLY GAMBITS (1984). For a compelling criticism of the book and 
its methods, see Draper, Journalism. History, and Journalistic History, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 
1984, (Review of Books) at 3. 
7. For an excellent inside account of the negotiations, see K. ADELMAN, THE GREAT 
UNIVERSAL EMBRACE: ARMS SUMMITRY- A SKEPTIC'S ACCOUNT (1989). 
8. Wilson, supra note 5, at 44-47. 
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pares favorably to most of our parliamentary competitors, 
particularly during the 198Qs.9 
Nor does the record of American foreign policy compare un-
favorably to that of parliamentary democracies. Again, Hardin at-
tributes too many of our mistakes to the particulars of our 
constitutional system rather than to the flaws inherent in all democ-
racies. Consider his argument that the inability to replace a politi-
cally disabled president is a major flaw in our system relative to 
parliamentary systems. Sometimes this inability is, to be sure, a dis-
advantage-recall Woodrow Wilson's incapacity after his series of 
strokes. Sometimes, parliamentary systems have benefited from the 
ability to replace a politically disabled leader-recall the replace-
ment of Neville Chamberlain during the Nazi invasion of France. 
Sometimes, Congress has gone too far in constraining presidential 
authority in foreign affairs-consider the Neutrality Legislation of 
the 1930s, and the War Powers Act of 1974. Overall, however, par-
liamentary systems have done no better and often considerably 
worse. British foreign policy has suffered from grave mistakes no 
less frequent or persistent than ours: appeasement during the 
1930s, the Suez adventure, and several aspects of post-war 
decolonization. 
Hardin gives American foreign policy too little credit. His 
apocalyptic tone suggests a system on the brink of crisis. This is 
false. Despite obvious problems, we enjoy a remarkable prosperity. 
Anyone pondering the case for constitutional reform must consider 
the extraordinary success of the American post-war policy of con-
taining communism. True, some believe that the policy of global 
containment rested on an exaggerated estimate of the Soviet threat, 
or produced counterproductive excesses in American foreign policy. 
Even granting this, we deserve great credit for maintaining the post-
war system at less cost and risk than the history of this century and 
the record of peacetime democracies, including Great Britain, 
would have given anyone the right to expect. Who would have pre-
dicted, at the onset of the Cold War, that we would manage to bring 
its end in sight on terms favorable to the West? We achieved this 
outcome against an implacable ideological adversary, a military co-
lossus, without having to fight another world war. This is a record 
which any parliamentary democracy should envy.w 
Even if we assume that a parliamentary system could have 
9. For a more optimistic assessment of the relative performance of the U.S. system, see 
1. NYE, BoUND TO LEAD: THE CHANGING NATURE OF AMERICAN POWER, 201-30 (1990). 
10. For a similar, although more qualified, argument along these lines, see J. GADDIS, 
THE LoNG PEACE 21 5-35 (1987). 
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done as well, the record suggests that our constitutional procedures 
can produce a largely successful foreign policy in perilous circum-
stances, without jeopardizing individual liberty. 
Granted, our system could use some fundamental reform. A 
combination of the weakening of political parties and dilution of the 
president's authority vis-a-vis Congress, and the diffusion of author-
ity within Congress, has excessively fragmented the power and re-
sponsibility necessary for effective government. We probably 
should strengthen presidential and congressional leadership, to help 
reverse "the tides of individualization and decentralization that 
have engulfed the Congress."11 As James Q. Wilson has written, 
however, "it is in this area of the unwritten constitution that reme-
dies for the defects of the separation of powers must be found. 
There are no constitutional remedies short of the abolition of the 
principle itself, and that is a price that two hundred years of suc-
cessful constitutional government should have taught us is too high 
to pay."I2 
REFORM AND REGRET: THE STORY OF FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE ALABAMA 
PRISON SYSTEM. By Larry W. Yackle.1 New York, 
N.Y.: Oxford University Press. 1989. Pp. xii, 322. $35.00. 
Elizabeth Alexander2 
As a decidedly minor character in the drama, I read Professor 
Larry Yackle's history of the Alabama prison litigation with special 
interest. This litigation arguably set the mold for most of the signif-
icant "conditions of confinement" litigation. Professor Yackle's 
treatment of it is both thorough and accurate. He shares with me a 
deep ambivalence about the outcome of the litigation, which can 
now be read as a cautionary tale about the limitations of litigation 
as an instrument for meaningful social reform. 
The book begins by describing the horrible conditions in the 
Alabama prison system at the time the litigation began, including 
the filthy, overcrowded punishment cells known as dog houses 
where prisoners were deprived of clothing, light, and running water. 
· ll. Wilson, supra note 5, at 52. 
12. /d. at 52. 
l. Professor of Law, Boston University. 
2. Associate Director for Litigation, National Prison Project of the American Civil 
Liberties Union Foundation. 
